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POSITIVE LAW IN HEGEL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT'
This paper will examine Hegel's jurisprudence in
his Philosophy of Right, pal·ticularly as it applies to
positive law. To render the strictly legal elements of
the work in the most straightforward way, I will abandon Hegel's own dialectical scheme of development in
favor of a more traditional jurisprudential outline of
topics. This approach has the danger of twisting Hegel
into an Austin, but every attempt will be made to
present a valid and textually verifiable interpretation
of Hegel's Philosophy of Right which will harmonize
with his masterfully complete and complex dialectic.
Hegel's systematic philosophy has been frequently
called a "total philosophy" because of its attempt to
engulf all human experience into its "grotesque and
rocky melody. ,,2 Therefore, any theoretical analysis of
his mature Philosophy of Right needs to take into
account that the text is only part of a much more
comprehensive work. Philosophy ol Right assumes
familiarity with the concepts of "objective spirit" and
"subjective spirit" as expounded in the Logic. This
interwea ving strengthens Philosophy of Right by grounding it in a rational system with powerful categories of
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analysis. 3 The disadvantage of the assuming nature of
the text is that for the novitiate the development of
theory is opaque. Nevertheless, armed with even a
minimal understanding of Hegelian notions of universality, particularity, and immediacy,PhiLosophyo(Uight
is a wonder of brevity, insight, and completeness."
PhiLosophy of Right is first and foremost a political philosophy which examines the progressive levels of
human will in institutions. Although the text has no
pretensions of being an historical treatment, it is
clearly developmental. The three levels of human will
al'e: (1) Abstract right--will is immediate, and right is
only abstmct or formal; (2) Morality--will is reflective
or self-conscious, but momlity or .-ight is purely subjective; (3) Ethical Iife--will is. self-conscious and
becomes social, i.e., universal, right is also objectified,
and freedom is actualized. 5
Ethical life itself has three separate stages of
progression, The fil'st stage is the family, wherein
ethical life itself is immediate and um'eflective. The

:lKlaus Hartmann, "Towal'£!s a new systematic reading of
He ge I' s rill 12soW!.LQLR.i~.hl," Tllil.S1<l te ill!J.lfJ.y it SQ.dm, t ran s .
Stephen Bungay and KlausHartmann<Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 117.
40ne of the most concise and helpful introductions to the
Hegelian concepts used in Philosol2h)' oLRi~h1 is T.M. Knox's
"Translator's Forward," l:fe~e1's- PhiIQsophl'-J!LR.i~ht (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967). See also Reyburn's tle~!'ll Ethi\:<lLTheo.r)'. Scholars with serious interest in Hegel will want to
look a t the first part of Hegel's Eillcyc\opelliJ.uil thILPhHosophlCill
:il:.iellC!!..S, usually referred to as his LQ~c.
5Bernard Cullen,lfu~l'S-SQJ;i,,1 and fu!ili!:.aLThQll~h1 <Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1979), p. 7:1.
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second stage is civil society. In civil society, ethical
life is self-conscious, and individuals, which may refer
to families as a body, I'ecognize other individuals as
important., and interaction results in the satisfaction
and multiplication of needs. In broad terms, civil
society is economic life which has a legal system and
free association (Korporationen) to mitigate the excesses of the market. The final stage of development is
the state, wherein all the component parts of civil
society are subsumed and welded into unity, and the
implicit universal ethical life of civil society is actualized without sacl'ificing subjective freedom. 6
Hegel's primary discussion of positive law is not
found in his tl'eatment of the state, but in his development of civil society. Nevertheless, his ideal of
the state does not preclude the existence of a legal
system. Although the state is concerned with more
than the security of individual life and property, which
is the primary function of law for Hegel. 7 The laws
of the subsumed civil society are nevertheless an important institution of the state. 8 Therefore, to extrapolate from Hegel's development of positive law in
civil society, a general Hegelian approach to positive
law does not do violence to the fabric of the text.
Looking to the text, one of the great difficulties
in interpretation is the confusion over the use of the
German word Recht. Recht, usually translated as
"right" by Knox, also carries with it a notion of law in

7 Geor·g- Wilhelm Fripdr'ich Hegel, Ih!LP~lQSQJ21ll'-~Lllidt,
trans. T.M. Knox, Gl'eat Books or the Western World, vol. 42
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 107.
8 Ihid ., pp. 2, !19, 100.
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a broad sense, although it is clearly distinguished from
law in the particular sense, i.e., statute or sanction. [
have interpreted Knox's "right, to when spoken of positively, to be synonymous with law.

Hegelian Natural Law
Fortunately, Hegel himself provides some crucial
distinctions as the text begins. Hegel clearly distinguishes between the laws of nature and the laws of
the land. The laws of nature are a form of law. They
are eternally valid. Nevertheless, they aloe external to
man; that is, man's cognizance or ignorance of the
laws of nature has no effect on their validity or operation. [n brief, the laws of nature are those patterns
of behavior in nature which are discoverable.!l The
laws of the land, on the other hand are posited by
man. They are not compulsive in the way the laws of
nature are, "and their diversity at once draws attention
to the fact that they al'e not absolute." 10 Hegel sees
in the laws of man a struggle between what is and
what ought to be. The "need fOl' studying the fundamentals of right" is a consequence of this struggle. II
SO, Hegel immediately avoids the ambiguous use of the
word law a La Montesquieu, a common criticism made
of natural law theories. 12
Nonetheless, Hegel is a natural law theorist. His

9 1bid " p. 115.
IOlbid.
Il lbid .
12 H .L . A. Hart, TbtLCQru;eut!lf Luw, Clarendon Law Series
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, l!)() I), pp. 182-8:.1.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

29

approach, however, differs l'adically from that used by
Catholic natural law theorists. Indeed, there are passages which, taken from context, would even suggest
the amoml analysis of a positivist. But such a reading
would be a gross misinterpretation. Hegel's system
does have natural, a priori standat'ds which the law
must meet. However, although these standat"ds are
sufficient to deny the validity of positive law, there is
never any suggestion that determination of legal validity is the purpose of natural law. 13 Natural law is
merely what is right. "in the nature of things." 14 Its
standards are set by the demands of philosophical
science. 15
Philosophical science is thinking dialectically,
which is the ability to conceive of both the universal
and the particular in concrete unity. This is a purely
Hegelian notion which should not be confused with the
traditional idea of formal or abstract reason or rationality. Philosophical science is as distinct from the
formal or empirical study of positive law as it is from
the abstraction of pure logic and reason. Under the
rubric of philosophical science, law must be "shown to
be wholly to the purpose and necessary to the time" in
order to fulfill the demands of history. 16 As the
Zeitgeist is manifest differently, law must be further
differentiated. This grounding of law in the Zeitgeist,
however, does not necessarily suggest accom13

Hegel, (>Jl!iQliOUhy of !{I.:ht, p. 139.

14T.M. Knox, trans., llc.:d':l PhUOliQuhy .of R!~ht
Oxford UnIversity Press, I !)(i7l, p. :lOon.

15Hegel, P!1!!oliQuhy Or Hl.:ht. pp. 1-7, 12.
lIi 1bid ., p. I 1.

(OXfOI·d:
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modation--it often suggests conscl'vation since law
"may have behind it the authority of tens of centuries." 17
(t should be noted at this point that fOl' Hegel,
God is in history--indeed, God is the Zeitgeist. Although Hegel grounds his natul"al law theory in his
Ood, there is a profound metaphysical difference between his natural law, discovered through dialectical
thinking, and Roman Catholic natural law discovered by
reason, because Hegel's God is not an absolute atemporal being but a fundamentally temporal and historical
spirit.
Since the natural standat'ds of law are fundamentally historical, the criteria for judging the validity of
positive law is quite lenient. For Hegel, positive law
has validity if it has meaning in contemporary conditions. I8 Moreover, the distinction between positive
and natural law is attenuated in Hegel.
Natural law, or law from the philosophical pOint of view, is
distinct from positive law; but to pervert their difference
into an opposition and a contradiction would be a gross misunderstanding. The relation between them is much more like that
bet ween the Institutes and Pandects. I9

Therefore, Hegel's discussion of natural law can hardly
be read as a criticism of positive law.

17 Ibid., p. 52.
18 Ibid ., pp. 10-11.
19 Ibid ., p. 10. The Instit.utes of .Justlllian was a brief texthook of law, and served as an introduction to the Pandects, the
complete codex of Roman case law. They were not, however, as
harmonious as Hegel would seem to suggest.
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Positive Law
[n fact, Hegel's Philosophy of Right is prefaced
with an unrestrained attack on contemporary critics of
law. Hegel characterizes the argument of Fries and
others as purely subjective. Fries argues that if man
were left to govern himself according to his subjective
inclinations, a communal spirit of friendship would
reign and people would dedicate themselves to service. 20 This argument, says Hegel, "tUl'ns the rich
inward articulation of ethical life, . . . which sets
determinate limits to the different circles of public life
and their rights [into) the broth of 'heart, friendship,
and inspiration. ".21 This murky reasoning is, for
Hegel, nothing but superficiality which demonstrates a
"hatred of the law."22
Appreciation of law, on the other hand, is the
trademark of I·eason .•Justice and ethical life are only
understood through thinking. Through thoughts, justice and ethical life receive rational form. Howevel',
this rational form is not merely the aggregate of everybody's first thought about the subject, but the
careful and exact thinking of it. This rational form is
law. Therefore, the conviction that unmitigated subjectivity represents utopia is nol only opposed to law,
but to reason itself.23
This defense of law is not a defense of natural
law, but of positive law, which is nothing more nor
20 Ibid., p. 3.

22 Ibid .,
23

p. 4.

.
IbHl., pp. 1·7, 115.
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less than abstract right posited by man and received as
valid in a particular state. 24 In other words, through
legislation law takes on its positive form. This positive form, in turn, receives positive content as the
la ws are administered. 25 The administration of justice
brings greater particularity and differentiation to the
law. For example, a law which prohibits theft is particularized as it is applied to plagiarism. 26
Hegel is quite clear about what the law is not.
Law is not the function of "inclination, caprice, and
the sentiments of the heal·t." Nor is law compatible
with force and tyranny. Force and tyranny, says
Hegel, are not part of a proper concept of law, and
are merely accidental to it. 27 Rather, positive law is
useful in meeting man's needs. 2il It serves an educative function by instructing individuals on how to
conduct themselves within society. 29 Most of all, the
end of law is the well being and happiness of private
individuals as well as the actualization of their subjective freedom.:lO
Hegel cannot be read as an apologist fOI' all positive law. Although he considers the increasingly de-

24 lbid ., pp. lO, 115.
25 lbid ., p. lO.

26 Knox, p. 306n.

28 lbid ., p. 137.
29 lbid ., pp. 70-71.
30

Ibid., pp. 62, 99.
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terminate character of law, and the differentiation or
particularity of law as ultimately favorable elements of
his theory, he admits that these very characteristics
open up the possibility for discrepancy between positive law and the principles of rightness. 31 Also, the
science of positive law, as detailed as men may make
it, will never resolve all the questions about the rationality of law. 32 Nevertheless, Hegel also says in order
for a right to be valid it must be posited in law, it
must be a legal right, susceptible to proof and recognition within the law. 3 :!

Procedural Justice
All hough Philosophy of' Flight has a complex development of a natural law theory, justice within positive law is tied to notions of procedural fairness.
Indeed, Hegel perceptively points out that an important
area of law is directly related to the administration of
justiee and the stat~--Ia w is not merely sanction. 34
Positive law, to be valid, must be known and recognized by all members of civil society. [t, in turn, must
recognize propel·ty and contract in its administration of
the Iaws. 35 The denial of property, contract, or liberty is only valid after specified procedul'es of adjudica31

Ibid., pp. 70-71.

3')
-Ibid., p. 46.

:l3 Ihill ., p. 1:19.
:l.J lhid ., p. 71.

:l5 Ihid ., p.

n.
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tion are fulfilled.:J6
The concept of promulgation receives particular
attention from Hegel. Promulgation cannot be divorced
from the positing of law. In order for law to be posited, i.e. become positive, it must be made- known. 37
Hence making a law is not to be represented as merely the
expression of a rule of behaviour valid for everyone, though
that is one moment in legislation; the more Important moment,
the inner essence of the matter, is knowled~e of the content
of the law In its determinate universality. 38

For Hegel, the positing of law is the moment in which
abstt'act right becomes both determinate and universal.
This implies not only that universal knowledge of the
law is necessary to make it binding, but that to conceal the law is, by definition, tyrannical.:J9 Inasmuch
as the outcome of a court of law has universal validity, judicial proceedings should be open to the public. 4o
Hegel is so insistent on the idea of promulgation
that he employs rather stirring language in favor of
simplification and codification of the laws.
To hang the laws so high that 110 citizell could read them (as
Dionysus the Tyrant did) is injustice of one and the sallie kind

:J6 Ibid., p. 73.
:J7.

Ibid., pp.

69-70.

38 Ihid ., p. 70.
39 Ibid ., p. 71.
40 Ibid ., p. 73.
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as to hury I.hem in row IIpon row of learned tornes, collections
uf dissenting- judgments and oplIIions, records of customs, etc.,
and ill a dead language too, so that knowledge of the law is
accessible ullly to those who have made law their professional
study.41

Codification of law is considered "a great act of justice" because it makes the law more accessible to all
people. Hegel realizes that this call for codification
could contradict his theory that the determination of
law is a continuing process. Nevertheless, he believes
that a code of simple general laws, based on true
principles, is a necessity.
Implicit in Hegel's discllssion of publicity of the
law is the idea of generality. Once law is legislated,
it is valid for all. 42 Administration of justice does not
discriminate on the basis of religion or race--every
man counts as a man by virtue of manhood alone. 43
The only person exempt from the generality of law is
the "personal majesty of the monarch," who is distinct
from the executive in Hegel's constitution. 44 The
reason for this exemption is that the monarch embodies
the constitution and is therefore not bound by its
differentiations.
[t should be noted that generality, or univet'sality
of law, implies more than just general application of
the law, but an elevation of law to a general or universallevel. This means that as law is posited through

41 Ibid ., p. 71.
.1"

-Ibid:, p. 70.

43 lhid ., p. 69.
H 1bid ., p. 96.
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THE PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

legislation, then violation of that previously abstract
right is no longer the mere violation of the property
or contract of an individual, but a crime against civil
society.45
Although Hegel's scheme is concerned with the
welfal'e of the poor, his concept of justice contains no
notions of equality. Property, in Hegel's economy, is
indispensable from individuality, and therefore it is
treated with great deference. Since Hegel's scheme is
differentiated and endlessly particularized, any sort of
equal division of resources is unfathomable. "What and
how much I possess," writes Hegel, "is a mattel' of
indifference so far as rights are concerned. ,,·W

Judicial Reasoning
As right is elevated from abstl'act immediacy to
determinate universality in positive law, there arises a
need for an institution to actualize posited right with·
out the subjective feeling of private intel·est. This is
the fundamental duty of public authority and the particular duty of the court of justice. 47 As mentioned
earlier, injury, under law, is no longer subjective, but
universal, and therefore all injury or wrong must be
settled in the court. In this way the law is reconciled
objectively--the injury or crime which suspends the
law is annulled (pl'esumably through punishment), and
law is restored. 48

45 Ibid .,

p. 72.

46 Ibid ., p. 24.
47 Ihid ., pp. 72.73.
48 Ibid ., p. 73.
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Hegel spells out clearly and carefully the way in
which the court arrives at a judgement. He divides
judgement into two parts: (1) ascertainment of the
nature of the case and (2) subsumption of the case
under law. 49 The nature of the case is the indictment
which instructs the judge on which laws are to be
applied. The subsumption of the case under law means
quite simply that only the general principle of law
indicated by indictment can be applied. The judge is
merely an organ of the law, and cannot act according
to his own discretion. 50 There are only two checks
external to law whkh lIegel places on judicial discretion: publicity and knowledge. As we have mentioned
previously, the universal applicability of judicial decisions makes public access the people's only guarantee
that proceedings are handled fairly, and public access
is only an adequate check if people are able to under·
stand the judicial process. 51
Hegel therefore places a heavy burden on the
laws themselves to be adequate instruments of justice.
Hegel claims that the concept of positive law sets a
general limit within which there is room for contingent
and arbitl'ary decisions. Law merely sets a maximum
and a minimum for the judge to work within, and in
good law, those limits are set well within the limits of

49 Ibid .• pp. 73-H.
50

.
.
Ihul.. p. 74.

51 lbid .
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justice. 52 However, Hegel does not see the judicial
process in mechanical terms, nor does he shut his eyes
to the fact that in the administration of justice th"ere
are frequent clashes between laws, or the demand for
further particularization of laws. Rath~r than avoid
these hard cases by giving the judge "mere fiat" or
discretion, Hegel's system offers an original and helpful
way out of the hard case. The clash of laws invokes
dialectical reasoning, and therefore, according to Hegel,
it can be worked out objectively, rationally and legally,
even when there may be no explicit solution in law. 5 :J

Legal Obligation
Since a member of civil society lives within the
law, he has a duty to acknowledge the decision of the
court. 54 Of course, Hegel has a natural law theory,
and legal obligation could be grounded in the natural
law. Yet it must be remembered that the grounding of
natural law for Hegel is not abstt·act. Therefore,
Hegel is extremely critical of arguments for noncompliance with law which rely on abstract thinking.
These abstractions, accOI'ding to the text, elevate subjectivity above the universal, which demonstrates no
understanding of the dialectic. Even logically, there
are real problems with reducing ethics to the realm of
private conviction. The logical and dialectical extremes of these non·compliance arguments are the
destl"Uction of right and wrong, and the elevation of
52 Ibid., p. 71.
53

.
Ibul.,
pp. 137-38.

54 lbid ., p. 70.
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intention to the highest ethical standard. 55
To have no obligation to law is the same as law
having no authority. At such a level or moment, Hegel
hypothesizes a Hobbesian war against all, since coercion is annulled only by coercion. 56 At this level, any
individual conviction would have veto power over convention. 57 Hegel mentions at least three sources for
the authority of law--God, the State, and history. In
Hegel, however, these three concepts are so tightly
interwoven that it would be fruitless, in this paper, to
make distinctions. What is important, is that in Philosophy of Right legal authority and obligation act as
"the bond which gave men, with all their deeds and
destiny coherence and subsistence. ,,58 This would
imply that law acts as an institution which coordinates
the disparate elements of society. In any case, abstract or mere thinking is not sufficient to deny the
validity of a reasonable concept of law, and the existing positive law should be reverenced. 59

Freedom
Perhaps the most compelling reason for legal and
political obligation is that the state is the "articulation
of the concept of freedom," and therefore we have
some duty or obligation to the institutions of the

55 lbid ., pp . .19.54.
5(}lbid., p. 36.
57 Ibid -., pp. 50-5-1.
58 lbid ., p. l15.

59 lbid ., p. 115.
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state. GO However, this is counterintuitive to prevalent
concepts of freedom which would characterize freedom
only in its positive sense, or what Hegel calls arbitrariness. 61 Hegel, however, is very critical of this
absolutist view of freedom. His first criticism is that
since human will is finite, choice itself will never
allow will to escape its finituuey2 Hegel complains
that too many theories of freedom divorce freedom
from its objects and aims, and thel'efore, freedom is
treated abstractly and formally rather than dialectically.63 If we look at the connete aims of freedom,
then limitations on caprice and impulse al'e actually
viewed as liberation, or, in other terms, law and morality are "indispensably requisite" to the ideal of freedom. 64 Because Hegel finds the origin, substance and
goal of law in freedom, subjective freedom is only
actualized within a system of Iaw. 65 In this way freedom is maintained without sacrificing objectivity.
Indeed, the activity of the will is the dissolution of
the contradiction between subjectivity and
objectivity.66

60 Ibid ., pp. 57,99, 107.
61 Ibid ., p. 16.

62 lbid .
63Hegel, The~hllll~I2~~LHi~t!H.¥, trans. J. Sihree, Great
Books of the Western World, vol. 42 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 172.

64 lbid .

66 Ibid .,

p. 18.
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The Constitution of the State
The modern state is the institution which finally
b.·ings unity to the universal and the particular. In
the place of the arbitrary will of the sovereign, there
is a legal system which recognizes civil rights. 67
Thus, freedom is actualized. However, there are important differences between the legal system of the
civil society and the legal system of the state. [n
civil society, the legal system acts as the arbiter between and coordinator of individual interests. In the
state, the law embodies the mind of a nation, so that
there is not mere coordination and arbitration, but
some defined purpose. 68 Whereas man in civil society
may have only considered himself a creature of the
state were he an employee of the government, man in
the state, by vir·tue of his manhood alone, is very
consciolls of being a member of the state. 69
Therefore, the state is not an externally constituted system. It must harmonize, in all ways, with
the particula.· development of law and custom of a
given nation. 70 It is for this reason that Hegel is
wary of mere constitution writing as the way to elevate society to the level of the state. He cites the
notable failure of Napoleon's attempt to give the Spanish a rational constitution as an example of an external

67 Ibid ., p. 142.
68 lbid ., p. 92,
69

. Ihlll., PI'. 84-89, 97, 104.

70lhid., p. 145.

4~
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constitution which "is meaningless and valueless. ,,71
Although the state may give "fresh and extended
determination,,72 to the law of civil society, the constitution of the state is primarily intended to embody
anu strengthen the existing legal system. Contrary t.o
some interpretat.ions of Hegel, [ find ample evidence to
suggest that the consciously adopted ends of the stat.e
are the individual's interests. Therefore, the elcml'nts
of procedural justice which exist in civil society are
implicit in the law of the state. 73 The state, however,
is concerned with the political as well as the legal.
Therefore, legal obligation is accompanied by political
obligation or duty. Hegel does not address as well as
he might the maintenance of fairness and freedom in a
universalized political system with a strong sense of
duty. We have already alluded to his repudiation of
the concept of material equality. H
But there are
other hints in Philosophy of Night about how political
power is restrained. For one thing, in a good state,
individual duties to the state are pl'oportionate to
individual rights against the state. 75 Thel'e are institutional controls on the misuse of state power.
Among them, is an educated, non-pat·tisan civil service.
Another control is the size and prestige of the state;
71 lbid .
72 Ibid.,

p. 99.

73 lbid ., pp. 84-85.

74 Ibid ., p. 24. " . . . all kinds of intellectual lIIediocrity
stulllhle on it [equality! at once when they are confronted hy the
relation of unity to difference."

75 Ibid .,

p. 83.

r
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hoth through emulation and extension, the stability of
the state is protected against ambition and faction. 76
Yet none of these ideas is fully developed.

Conclusion
Philosophy of Right presents a complex and complete theOl'y of law which grounds law and politics in
the unfolding dialectic of history. However, Hegel
does not ever satisfactorily distinguish the natural
from the positive law. Moreover, he never gives us a
firm foundation for legal authority, although there is a
strong sense of legal obligation. These problems seem
to be part and parcel of his over-arching metaphysical
theory because Hegel does not appeal to an absolute 01'
formal realm of authority, only to the unfolding spirit
of history; justilkation is tempoml. [t is for this
reason that Hegel has been derogatorily labeled as a
defender of the status quo. Philosophy of Right is
most instructive in its analyses of procedural justice,
judicial reasoning, and ft'eedom under law. Curiollsly,
these analyses fOCllS on the rule of positive law in
society, albeit in relation to the further differentiation
of the mind and will. Even in the state, law applies
equally to all, even govemment officials (the noted and
notable exception being the monarch). Furthermore,
there are procedural rules to insure that the law is
llsed only as an instrument of justice.
The importance of this implicit defense of the
rule of bw cannot be overestimated, primarily in the
way in which it functions vis ci vis the Marxist critique of law, which also employs a form of the dialectic,
and the Critical Legal Studies movement, which daims
some of its ascendancy from the continental tradition.

7G 1hid ., flP. 98-9!J.
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Inasmuch as there has been a great revival of' Hegelian
studies in continental philosophy, Hegel's discussion of'
positive law in Philosophy of Right may be a way of'
bridging several different schools of' jurisprudence.
PAUL STRINGHAM EDWARDS
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